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REMOTE TESTIMONY
Richard D. Friedman*
Recently, the Supreme Court declined to pass on to Congress a proposed change to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 submitted to it by the Judicial Conference.
In this Article, Professor Friedman addresses this proposal, which would allow for
more extensive use of remote, video-based testimony at criminal trials. He agrees
with the majority of the Court that the proposal raised serious problems under the
Confrontation Clause. He also argues that a revised proposal, in addition to better
protecting the confrontation rights of defendants, should include more definite
quality standards, abandon its reliance on the definition of unavailability found
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and allow defendants greater flexibility in the use
of remote testimony. Finally, he tentatively offers a suggested revision that ad-
dresses the concerns he raises.
INTRODUCTION
Usually, the Supreme Court regards itself as a mere conduit for
proposed amendments to the several bodies of Federal Rules of
practice and procedure that are submitted to it by the Judicial
Conference of the United States after a lengthy rulemaking proc-
ess.' Occasionally, though, the Court declines to pass a proposed
amendment on to Congress.! Recently, in submitting to Congress
an extensive set of proposed changes to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Court held back an amendment to Rule
26 that would greatly change the manner in which witnesses may
* Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Hutchins
Hall Ann Arbor, MI 48109, (734) 647-1078, rdfrdman@umich.edu. B.A. 1973, Harvard
University; J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School; D.Phil. 1979, Oxford University. This Article is
based in part on testimony given before the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure on April 25, 2001. Many thanks to Lynn Helland, Steve Penrod, and
Michael Saks.
1. See Statement ofJustice White, 507 U.S. 1091, 1095 (1993) (stating that the Court's
role "is to transmit the Judicial Conference's recommendations without change and without
careful study, as long as there is no suggestion that the committee system has not operated
with integrity"); Order adopting amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 416
U.S. 1003 (1974) (noting the opposition of Justice Douglas "to the Court's being a mere
conduit of Rules to Congress"); Statement of Douglas, J., dissenting from the submission to
Congress of Rules of Evidence, 409 U.S. 1132, 1133 (1972) ("The Court concededly is a
mere conduit.").
2. See, e.g., Letter of Transmittal, Apr. 30, 1991, reprinted at 500 U.S. at 964 (noting
that the Court, though transmitting various proposed Rules amendments, is not transmit-
ting amendments proposed by the Judicial Conference to seven of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "pending further consideration by the Court").
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testify in criminal trials. The amendment would have allowed a trial
witness, in a limited set of circumstances, to give her trial testimony
contemporaneously from a remote location, with her image pre-
sented in the courtroom by a video connection. It appears that a
majority of the Court feared that the amendment might violate the
right of an accused under the Sixth Amendment "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.
"0
The Court's action does not end the matter. It is possible that
Congress will restore the deleted amendment, adding it to the
Rules by statute.4 Even if this does not happen, the Advisory Com-
mittee for the Rules of Criminal Procedure may in time draft a
revised proposal that is more likely to pass Supreme Court muster.
Furthermore, some federal courts have allowed remote testimony
in some circumstances even absent a sanction in the Rules, and
until such time as the Court gives definitive guidance to the con-
trary this practice may continue-though one would certainly
expect the Court's recent action to give them pause. Finally, re-
mote testimony is also of interest to the states.5 Though the
constitutionality of state rules and practices allowing such testi-
mony would eventually be tested in the Supreme Court, they,
unlike the Federal Rules, can continue to be put into place without
any form of prior approval by the Court.
In this Article, I will consider the promise and dangers of re-
mote testimony in criminal cases, with particular reference to the
proposed amendment that survived most of the way through the
rulemaking process before being short-circuited by the Supreme
Court. I believe that the Court was right in perceiving that the pro-
3. U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. Justice Scalia, in a statement accompanying the submis-
sion to Congress, said: "I share the majority's view that [the proposal] is of dubious validity
under the Confrontation Clause . . .. " Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (April 29, 2002) 1 (statement of Scalia, J.) [hereinafter Statement of Scalia, J.1,
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr02p.pdf (last visited
June 26, 2002). Justice Breyer, in a dissenting statement joined by Justice O'Connor, simi-
larly said: "The Court has decided not to transmit the proposed Rule because, in its view, the
proposal raises serious concerns under the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 4 [hereinafter
Statement of BreyerJ.]. No other member of the Court issued a statement on the matter.
4. Such a development has occurred before. In 1994, the Supreme Court altered a
proposed amendment to FED. R. EvI. 412, the "rape shield" rule, deleting a clause that
would extend the Rule to civil cases. Letter of Chief Justice Rehnquist to John F Gerry,
Chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference, April 29, 1994, reprinted in
154 F.R.D. 510. But Congress passed a statute promulgating an amended Rule 412, in the
form in which it had been submitted to the Court. Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 40141 (b), 108 Star.
1796, 1818 (1994). The interest of the justice Department favoring the amendment to Rule
26 suggests that similar action in this case is not implausible.
5. See Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998) (al-
lowing remote testimony in certain circumstances and establishing guidelines for its use).
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posal as presented to it was of dubious constitutionality under the
Confrontation Clause.6 The proposal suffered from other prob-
lems as well. But in some circumstances remote testimony has
potential to improve and expedite the administration of justice.
The Supreme Court's action should not cause the matter to die.
Rather, rulemakers should revisit it, and develop a more cautious
amendment that avoids problems of the recently rejected proposal
and clearly comports with the Confrontation Clause.
I. THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT AND THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The confrontation right has reached its fullest flower in the
common law system, but it transcends that system. The King James
Version of the Bible quotes the Roman governor Festus as declar-
ing: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die,
before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and
have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid
against him."7 Within our system, the right reflects a profound
commitment to the proposition that the testimony of a prosecution
witness should be given under certain prescribed conditions. Tes-
timony should be under oath, subject to cross-examination, in the
6. The confrontation right is a topic that has interested me for some years, almost to
the point of preoccupation. See, for example, my articles: Confrontation Rights of Criminal
Defendants, inJ. F. NIJBOER & J. M. REIJNTJES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORLD CONFER-
ENCE ON NEW TRENDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE 533-41 (1997);
Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1011 (1998); Thoughts from
Across the Water on Hearsay and Confrontation, 1998 CRIM. L. REV. 687; Truth and Its Rivals in the
Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1998); Confrontation and the Definition
of Chutzpa, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 506 (1997); Lilly v. Virginia: Glimmers of Hope for the Confrontation
Clause, INT'L COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE, July 10, 2000,
http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/ice/papers/hearsayl.html (last visited June 26, 2002); see also
Richard Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1171 (2002).
In addition, I was one of the authors of the Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties
Union in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). Justice Breyer, one of the members of the
plurality in that case, wrote a concurring opinion referring extensively to the brief and ex-
pressing considerable sympathy for the views advanced in it. Id. at 140-42. (Breyer, J.
concurring). These views are in many ways compatible with those of Justices Scalia and
Thomas. (Justice Breyer did not perceive a serious confrontation problem with the pro-
posed amendment to Rule 26, but the issue presented by cases like Lilly, of when
confrontation is required, is orthogonal to the issue presented by that proposal, of what
kind of confrontation is adequate when confrontation is required.) I am hopeful, therefore,
that a reconceptualization of the Confrontation Clause along the lines we suggested will
occur in the not-so-distant future.
7. Acts 25:16 (KingJames).
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presence of the accused-the time-honored phrase "face to face" is
repeated in numerous English statutes beginning in the sixteenth
century t-and, if reasonably possible, in the presence of the fact-
finder.
The common law recognized that in some circumstances this
last condition could not feasibly be satisfied; a witness might, for
example, be dead by the time of trial, or too ill to testify at trial.
Thus, the law allowed the possibility of taking the witness's testi-
mony beforehand, by a deposition that could then be presented at
trial if the witness were unable to appear.' But the law sedulously
protected the accused's right to be present at the deposition and to
c C( )ss-examine.1°
And thus the law remains. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
15 preserves both the possibility of taking a deposition-where this
is necessary to preserve the witness' testimony for trial-and the
right of the accused to attend the deposition and cross-examine
the witness. But even given these safeguards, the deposition proce-
dure is available only in "exceptional circumstances." The norm for
giving testimony is stated by the current Rule 26:
Rule 26. Taking of Testimony
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in
open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress
or by these rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court."
II. THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE'S PROPOSAL
Modern technology creates a possibility not available when the
modern form of trial developed or when the Confrontation Clause
was written into our Constitution: A witness not actually present in
the courtroom can, if the law allows, testify live by video transmis-
sion to the courtroom. Thus, the technology makes it possible for a
8. See, e.g., An Acte whereby certayne Offences bee made Treason, 13 Eliz., ch. 1, § 9
(1571) (Eng.); see also, e.g., Duke of Somerset's Trial, 1 Howell's State Trials 515, 520 (1551).
9. See, e.g., R. v. Forbes, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 (1814).
10. See, e.g., id. (providing the defendant the right to be present at deposition of dying
victim and to cross-examine).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
[VOL. 35:4
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witness who could not appear in the courtroom to testify under
oath and cross-examination, as in a traditional deposition, but to
do so contemporaneously and with her demeanor apparent to the
fact-finder.
There are clear benefits for a system of criminal adjudication in
allowing such remote testimony in some circumstances. Most obvi-
ously, the testimony of the witness is preserved. Of course, a
deposition does that, but remote testimony has advantages over
depositions as well. Video transmission is clearly preferable to the
traditional means of preserving and presenting deposition testi-
mony, by stenographically recorded transcript, but that is not the
principal point. Depositions can and sometimes are recorded and
presented by sound-and-visual means, and probably this should
now be required whenever feasible (as it almost always would be)
as a predicate for use of the deposition as evidence against an ac-
cused. There are, however, two advantages that remote testimony
offers even over a deposition preserved by videotape. First (putting
aside the constitutional issue for the moment), remote transmis-
sion has an efficiency advantage, in that counsel and the accused
can see and be seen by, and hear and be heard by, the witness
without traveling to where the witness is. Second, remote testimony
has a timing advantage, in that the witness's testimony can be taken
during trial, at the same time it would be taken were the witness to
testify live in the courtroom, rather than in advance. A deposition
also can theoretically be taken during trial, but that usually creates
a significant interruption in the conduct of the trial. Accordingly,
the deposition is usually held before trial, when counsel may not
be as informed about the case (including the testimony of other
witnesses) as they will be when the testimony is actually presented.
With these advantages in mind, the Advisory Committee drafted
a proposal-approved by the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and by the Judicial Conference of the
United States-to replace the current Rule 26 by the following:
Rule 26. Taking Testimony
(a) In General. In every trial the testimony of witnesses
must be taken in open court, unless otherwise pro-
vided by a statute or by rules adopted under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072-2077.
(b) Transmitting Testimony from a Different Location.
In the interest of justice, the court may authorize
contemporaneous, two-way video presentation in
SUMMER 2002]
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open court of testimony from a witness who is at a
different location if:
(1) the requesting party establishes exceptional
circumstances for such transmission;
(2) appropriate safeguards for the transmission
are used; and
(3) the witness is unavailable within the meaning
of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (4)-(5).2
The Supreme Court submitted to Congress the language of part
(a) of this proposal-which amounts merely to a clarifying
amendment of the current Rule-but it declined to submit part
(b), the provision for remote testimony.
The proposal sidetracked by the Supreme Court raises several
concerns. Section III of this Article addresses the most prominent
one of these, and the one that led to the Court's action. I conclude
that the Court was correct in regarding the proposal in its current
form as raising a serious question of constitutionality under the
Confrontation Clause: At least on the present state of our knowl-
edge, the accused should have a right to be physically present
when the witness testifies from a remote location. Section IV dis-
cusses the standard of unavailability that should govern when a
prosecution witness ought to be allowed to testify from a remote
location. It concludes that a Rule providing for such testimony
needs its own definition of unavailability, rather than one bor-
rowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence. Section V addresses
more technical issues, concluding that the proposal's proper re-
quirement of two-way transmission is appropriate and that a revised
Rule should, without delving into technological details, state addi-
tional standards of quality for the transmission. Section VI briefly
analyzes the substantially different considerations that arise when it
is the defense rather than the prosecution that seeks to present
remote testimony. Finally, a concluding section summarizes much
12. Proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 [hereinafter Proposed Rule], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supctllO1/CRRedline.pdf (last visited June 26, 2002), re-
printed as an appendix to Statement of BreyerJ., supra note 3. This proposal was amended in
several particulars from the one originally published by the Advisory Committee in August
2000, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2OO1/amendments/crb.pdf (last
visited June 26, 2002) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Draft]. For example, the Judicial
Conference proposal, unlike the original one, would require two-way transmission. Also, the
two versions use somewhat different language to describe the circumstances in which video
testimony is acceptable. See infra note 27.
[VOL. 35:4
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of the analysis by presenting a tentative suggested redraft of the
proposed amendment.
Allowing testimony from a remote location in some circum-
stances is a natural development that offers substantial benefits for
the judicial system. Although remote testimony may occasionally
be an acceptable substitute for in-court testimony, it is still very
much a second-best procedure. Congress should not enact Rule
26(b) as proposed by the Judicial Conference. But the Advisory
Committee should revisit the matter, presenting a revised proposal
that would allow the procedure to be used in appropriate circum-
stances, avoid serious questions under the Confrontation Clause,
and ensure that the procedure is as effective as it can reasonably be
made.
III. CONFRONTING THE WITNESS, FACE TO FACE
For now, I will focus on prosecution witnesses and assume that
the witness is clearly unavailable to testify at trial, though available
to testify from a remote location. I will also assume for now that the
proposed transmission of the testimony will be by high-quality two-
way video, so that the witness can both see and be seen by those in
the courtroom, and will avoid the possibility that the witness is be-
ing coached from off camera.
Even such transmission lacks the immediacy of presence in the
courtroom. Does this difference raise a Confrontation Clause prob-
lem?
Impairment of the fact-finder's ability to observe the demeanor
of the witness is not a major constitutional concern. The tradi-
tional stenographically-recorded deposition gives the fact-finder no
opportunity to observe demeanor, except as it may be apparent
from the face of the transcript. This has not been thought to raise
a constitutional problem, given that the witness is unavailable to
testify at trial' 3 --though perhaps it should, given that a deposition
can be recorded and presented via videotape. But in any event two-
way video transmission would give the fact-finder essentially the
same opportunity to observe demeanor that a video-recorded
deposition does. Even if this opportunity is somewhat less satisfac-
tory than is afforded by presence in the same room with the
13. Cf Statement of Breyer, J., supra note 3, at 4 ("It is not obvious how video testi-
mony could abridge a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights in circumstances where an
absent witness' testimony could be admitted in nonvisual form via deposition regardless.").
SummRava 2002]
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witness, this does not raise a constitutional problem, so long as the
presentation is clear and undistorted.
Nor does a significant constitutional problem arise from the
possibility that the formal trappings of the courtroom may have
less impact, in making apparent the solemnity of the occasion, on a
witness who is testifying from a remote location than they do on a
witness who is actually in the courtroom. Given that remote testi-
mony would be presented by two-way video, the witness would have
at least some view of the courtroom. Again, the comparison to
deposition witnesses is useful. Whether her testimony is recorded
stenographically or by video, a deposition witness does not see the
courtroom.
It appears to have been considerations such as these that led the
Advisory Committee to perceive electronically transmitted testi-
mony as "in most regards superior to other means of presenting
testimony in the courtroom,' 4 a comparison that presumably
should exclude live testimony by a witness actually present in the
courtroom. But testimony transmitted from a remote location still
lacks an element integral both to live testimony in the courtroom
and to deposition testimony-the presence of both the accused
and counsel in the same room as the witness.
There are two effects of this deficit that we cannot put aside eas-
ily. First, even with two-way transmission, would the distance and
sense of insulation diminish the sense of confrontation-not an
idly chosen term-that a prosecution witness faces when testifying
against an accused? Second, would defense counsel be impaired to
any significant degree in cross-examining such a witness by the
sense of distance and by the delay in transmission that, even with
up-to-date technology, is still noticeable? 6 Each of these effects is
perfectly plausible. I do not know of any extant studies that can
14. Committee Note to Proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 [hereinafter Committee Note],
supra note 12, at 74-75.
15. Federal courts have occasionally allowed the use at trial of depositions taken over-
seas that incarcerated defendants were not allowed to attend, though they were connected
to the deposition room telephonically. United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 7 (lst Cir.
1997); United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1006 (1990).
Such depositions appear to violate FED. R. CGRIM. P. 15. In any event, they create most of the
problems of electronically transmitted testimony without the advantages of simultaneity or
of the accused and witness being able to see images of each other.
16. There is a slight but perceptible lag between the time one person speaks and the
time a viewer at the other end sees and hears the first person speak. Also, a technical diffi-
culty occasionally creates a noticeable delay between what is seen and what is heard. See
Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998).
[VOL. 35:4
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give substantial comfort on these points. 7 At least absent confi-
dence on these grounds, I believe there is considerable merit to
Justice Scalia's aphorism: "Virtual confrontation might be sufficient
to protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is suffi-
cient to protect real ones."'
Perhaps, at first, this concern appears unduly persnickety; even
if electronic transmission is not the full equivalent of presence in
the same room, it can provide good visual and audial reception of
the witness at one end and the accused and counsel at the other. If
the only alternative to remote testimony is to lose the evidence of
the witness altogether, then the appeal of remote testimony is very
strong.
But even assuming that the witness cannot be brought to the
courtroom, another alternative usually will be available and will, in
many circumstances, be more satisfactory: The accused and coun-
sel may be brought to the witness.
Suppose, for example, that a witness is too physically infirm to
be brought to the courtroom, but the witness is testifying from a
hospital in the same city. The accused may well want the witness to
testify "face to face," and the request should be honored in accor-
dance with the longstanding practice. '9 Counsel may also want to
17. One rather well-known study, described in Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Note,
Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809, 813-17 (1987),
asked children to recount what they had witnessed in viewing a recording of a father-
daughter conflict. The researchers found that children gave more complete and accurate
accounts when questioned by a single interrogator in a small room than when questioned
under court-like conditions. But in the first condition, the questioner was in the room with
the child, not attempting to examine her from a distant location. More fundamentally, this
study did not test which style of interrogation is best suited for exposing false accounts of
events that never occurred. In another well-known study, described in G.R. Miller, The Effects
of Videotaped Trial Materials onjuror Response, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 185-208 (Gordon
Bermant et al. eds., 1976), and Gordon Miller et al., Real versus reel: What's the verdict?, 24J.
OF COMM. 99 (1974), one set ofjurors viewed a live re-enactment of an auto negligence trial
and another set viewed a videotape of the re-enactment. The researchers reported no sig-
nificant differences between the two groups in the extent to which they attributed
negligence, the mean awards where they found for the plaintiff, their ratings of attorney
credibility, or their own interest. As Steve Penrod has pointed out to me, the experiment did
not address whether the different conditions affected jurors' understanding, memory for, or
evaluation of the testimony, or their assessments of witness credibility or their confidence in
ability to assess that credibility. Further, in this experiment as in the one by Hill & Hill, the
interrogators were in the same room as the witnesses.
18. Statement of Scalia, J., supra note 3, at 2. Justice Scalia also noted that "a purpose
of the Confrontation Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make their accusations in the
defendant's presence--which is not equivalent to making them in a room that contains a televi-
sion set beaming electrons that portray the defendant's image." Id.
19. See, e.g., R. v. Forbes, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 (1814) (upholding the right of defendant
to be present at deposition of dying victim and to cross-examine).
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cross-examine in person, believing that the differential in effec-
tiveness is worth thejourney.
As the witness becomes more distant, or even crosses bounda-
ries, the logistics become more difficult, but this does not
materially alter the principle: If the accused and counsel wish to be
present, they ought to be allowed to be, as they are allowed to for a
deposition, even if the defendant is in custody. If exceptions
(apart from principles of waiver and forfeiture) should be made to
this principle, they should be only for unusual cases in which it is
not feasible to bring the accused and counsel into the same room
as the witness. Such cases may arise if both the accused and the
witness are too ill to travel,2 or if the witness is in a foreign nation
that is willing to cooperate, but only to a degree, with American
testimonial requirements and either the witness is in custody or the
accused is in custody and the witness is unwilling to travel to the
20. Committee Note, supra note 14, cites United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.
1988), for the proposition that the presence of counsel and the accused with the witness is
not an indispensable requirement. Committee Note, supra note 14, at 75. In Salim, the ac-
cused was in federal custody and a key witness was in custody in France. The court allowed
use of a deposition of the witness that was taken under conditions according with French law
but not satisfying the ordinary conditions for a deposition under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 15. The merits of Salim are dubious, especially with respect to the confrontation
right. If a foreign government does not allow testimony of an accusatory witness to be taken
under conditions satisfactory to our system, it does not seem that our courts should admit
the deficient form of testimony that the foreign government does allow. But whatever the
merits of Salim, it is clearly not a guide to the standards that should be applied in the domes-
tic context, when our system is free to set its own rules. Salim itself explicitly distinguished
that context, noting that the decision was determined by factors not usually applicable. 855
F.2d at 949.
21. See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999). A crucial witness against
Gigante was Peter Savino, who participated in the Federal Witness Protection Program. At
the time of trial he was in the final stages of an inoperable, ultimately fatal, cancer. The trial
judgeJack Weinstein, concluded by "clear and convincing proof" that the witness could not
appear in court. Id. at 80. Gigante himself wras in ill health and deemed unable to travel. Id.
at 81. In these circumstances-given the apparent impossibility of placing Gigante and Sav-
ino in the same room without endangering one or the other of them-it is at least plausible
that the prosecution ought to be allowed to present electronically transmitted testimony of
the witness from a remote location without the defendant having been present at that loca-
tion. (Even here, Gigante has a plausible argument that the testimony ought not be
presented without him having the opportunity to be in the same room as Savino, and given
that he could not travel without endangering his health and the prosecution was unwilling
to move Savino, the testimony should not be presented.) In any event, apparently Gigante
did not seek to be taken to the remote location; rather, he objected to the court's order
allowing Savino to testify from that location. Indeed, Gigante's counsel explicitly waived any
right to ensure that Savino and Gigante would be looking eye to eye via video transmission
during Savino's testimony. Id. at 80 n.1. If Gigante had insisted that he or his counsel be
brought to Savino, a different question would have been presented.
[VOL 35:4
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United States.22 If it really is not feasible to bring the accused and
counsel together with the witness, then the attractiveness of elec-
tronically transmitted testimony, the only way of securing the
witness's testimony at all, is considerable. On the other hand,
prosecutors travel to meet witnesses when they believe it is neces-
sary to secure testimony or information from them, and
contentions that it would not be feasible to bring the defendant or
counsel to the witness ought not be accepted without close exami-
nation. Beyond that, even if electronic transmission is indeed the
only way the testimony can be secured, if it does not satisfy our
standards for testimony then it is simply not acceptable. For the
reasons stated above, we do not yet have a basis for concluding that
it is the equivalent of face-to-face testimony. That in itself is not
necessarily dispositive, for there is a question of what the appropri-
ate baseline is; one could argue that even if we cannot be confident
that remote testimony protects the confrontation right as well as
face-to-face testimony does, we at least can be confident that it is
good enough, if it is the best we can do. But given that for centu-
ries testimony in our system has with virtual uniformity been given
face to face, that mode provides the most natural baseline, and we
should be reluctant to accept a standard that deviates downwards
from it.
In concluding that the Judicial Conference proposal did not
raise a serious Confrontation Clause problem, the Advisory Com-
mittee and Justices Breyer and O'Connor, dissenting from the
Supreme Court's decision not to pass the proposed amendment to
Congress, relied on Maryland v. Craig.2 3 But such reliance is
22. If the witness is in foreign custody, the foreign nation may be willing to allow the
witness to testify by remote, and otherwise according to ordinary American practice, but
unwilling either to allow the witness to be taken to the American courtroom where the case
is being tried or to allow the accused, and perhaps counsel, to be brought to where the wit-
ness is being held in custody. Similarly, if the accused is being held in custody and the
witness is overseas and unwilling to come to the United States, arranging a face-to-face depo-
sition may be difficult. The United States Marshals Service lacks jurisdiction to hold federal
detainees on foreign soil and the foreign nation may be unwilling to assume even temporary
custody of the accused. See United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997). On the
other hand, a rule that allows remote testimony whenever a foreign government resists face-
to-face confrontation gives American authorities the wrong incentive, to treat foreign objec-
tions as dispositive rather than to try to negotiate around them. If the foreign government
refused to allow the witness to testify altogether, that would notjustify using a statement that
the witness made to the police in lieu of cross-examined testimony. Cf McKeeve, supra, at 6
("spare confines of the British scheme" apparently prevented video transmission). As with
respect to Salim, supra note 20, if the foreign government is unwilling to allow a witness to
testify according to our standards and the American authorities are unwilling or unable to
persuade it to relent, there is a strong argument that is not the accused who should suffer.
23. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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misplaced. In Craig, a divided Court held that, upon a showing that
a child witness would be traumatized by having to testify in the
courtroom, she could testify by closed-circuit television, with coun-
sel in another room with her but not the accused, the judge, or the
jury. The hookup approved by the Craig Court allowed the judge
and accused to communicate electronically with counsel, and al-
lowed all those in the courtroom to see the witness, but it did not
allow the witness to see those in the courtroom. Craig was a 5-4 de-
cision of dubious merit, and it should not be extended outside the
realm of child witnesses, or beyond the circumstance in which a
particularized showing is made that the specific witness would be
subject to trauma by testifying in the courtroom.24 Moreover, at
most Craig enunciated a constitutional outer bound within which
departures from the norm of testimony given face-to-face would be
tolerated; it is not a useful guidepost for choosing good policy sen-
sitive to the concerns underlying the Confrontation Clause.
Beyond all this, the situation of the child witness who would be
traumatized by presence in the courtroom and by having to testify
face-to-face with the accused is fundamentally different from that
of the witness who is fully able to testify but cannot be brought to
the courtroom. In the former case, by hypothesis, electronically
transmitted testimony creates as much confrontation as can be
done without traumatizing the child. In the latter case, by contrast,
if the accused and counsel are not in the same room as the witness
then in most cases there is a foregone opportunity for confronta-
tion, because presumably they could be brought together.
But if counsel and accused are with the witness at a remote loca-
tion, then how should the testimony be presented in court? The
accused might argue that simultaneous transmission back to the
courtroom, while the accused is elsewhere with the witness, violates
his right to be present at trial. Given that the witness is testifying at
a location remote from the fact-finder, the whole idea of the trial
having a venue tends to break down. Thus, the accused's argu-
ment, more precisely stated, would be that he has a constitutional
24. The Craig majority said that "a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses
may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of
such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." 497 U.S. at 850. A sound conception of the
Confrontation Clause does not emerge from the apparent implication of this statement, that
the defendant may be denied "a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial" if that is neces-
sary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured. Putting aside that broader concern, I doubt that the Supreme Court meant mere
inability to secure the trial testimony of the witness to constitute such an "important public
policy."
[VOL. 35:4
HeinOnline  -- 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 706 2001-2002
Remote Testimony
right not only to be present with the witness when the witness gives
her testimony but also to be present with the fact-finder when the
fact-finder receives the testimony. The argument is not clearly right
-perhaps video transmission, so that the accused and fact-finder
can see and hear each other, is sufficient in this context. But at
least in the usual circumstance, it seems unnecessary to reach the
constitutional issue, because if the accused and counsel are with
the witness at a remote location there rarely will be any substantial
gain in transmitting the testimony to the fact-finder simultaneously.
The trial cannot proceed further in any event until the accused
and counsel have returned to the courtroom, and little time would
be lost in presenting the remote witness's testimony at that time by
videotape. 5
Of course, if the accused and counsel are present with the wit-
ness when the witness testifies, and the testimony is later presented
to the fact-finder by videotape, then what we have is an ordinary
video deposition. So in a sense I am saying that the accused should
have the option of having the testimony taken by video deposition
rather than transmitted electronically from a remote location. I
think, however, it would often be appropriate to put the accused to
the choice. Suppose that before trial the prosecution indicates its
desire to present the testimony of a witness from a remote location.
The accused may insist that he and his counsel should be present
with the witness when she testifies. But the court might determine
that if this is the case, it is far more efficient to take the testimony
of the witness beforehand, rather than for the trial to be disrupted
while the accused and counsel travel to the remote location, take
the testimony, and return. Thus, the court should be able to tell
the accused:
"If you and your counsel want to be in the room with the wit-
ness when she testifies and present in the courtroom when
the testimony is presented, you may do so, but if you do, the
testimony must be taken before trial. If, like the prosecution,
you prefer for the testimony to be taken during trial, then it
will be transmitted electronically from the remote location
and presented at that time in the courtroom."
25. One can imagine circumstances in which simultaneous transmission of testimony
would entail some substantial efficiencies. If a witness's testimony is very lengthy, then there
are some savings in having it transmitted to the fact-finder while it is being given, so that
counsel and the accused (and the judge, if she participated in the taking of the testimony)
need not sit through the testimony a second time. But these savings may be insufficient to
warrant pressing the issue for now.
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V. UNAVAILABILITY
Suppose now that the prosecution gives ample notice of its in-
tent to present the testimony of a witness from a remote location,
and that the accused and counsel have no interest in traveling to
be with the witness as she testifies. But the accused contends that
the witness ought to testify live in the courtroom if at all. The criti-
cal question then is: What circumstances justify remote testimony?
It seems clear that live testimony in open court should remain
the norm for criminal cases, at least for prosecution witnesses. If a
prosecution witness can testify live at trial in the traditional man-
ner, then she ought to do so. There does not seem to be much
disagreement on this point. Subdivision (b) (1) of the amendment
proposed by the Judicial Conference would require "exceptional
circumstances" for remote testimony to be allowed, and subdivision
(b) (3) would require that the witness be "unavailable within the
meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4)-(5) .,,26 Especially
in light of the vagueness of the term "exceptional circumstances,"
27
I suspect that, if this proposal were to become effective, subdivision
(b) (1) would have little independent force and that many courts
would deem it satisfied when subdivision (b) (3) is satisfied. The
26. Proposed Rule, supra note 12.
27. Use of the word "exceptional" is a change from the draft proposal published in
August 2000, which used the word "compelling" instead. Advisory Committee Draft, supra
note 12. The change, however, does not improve the proposal significantly. The Advisory
Committee noted that the "exceptional circumstances" standard was used in United States v.
Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999), in approving a use of testimony transmitted from a
remote location. Gigante, which is discussed further in note 21 supra, adopted that standard
from the one prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, which discusses when
the testimony of a prospective witness should be taken by deposition and preserved for use
at trial. Id. But the question whether a pre-trial deposition should be taken for possible use
at trial is considerably different from the question of whether a witness should be allowed to
testify during trial from a remote location, and there is no reason that the standards for the
two questions should be congruent.
The Advisory Committee acknowledged that "it is difficult to catalog examples of circum-
stances considered to be 'exceptional.'" Committee Note, supra note 14, at 75. The one
example the Committee offered illustrates the difficulty of applying the term: "[T] he inabil-
ity of the defendant and the defense counsel to be at the witness's location would normally
be an exceptional circumstance." Id. This seems to get matters almost precisely backwards.
The ability of the defendant and defense counsel to be present at the remote location from
which the witness is testifying is a factor making remote testimony more acceptable (though if
the defendant or counsel actually take advantage of the opportunity the testimony would, at
least often, be taken before trial, by deposition); indeed, the central theme of this Article is
that, at least arguably, their opportunity to be present should be a prerequisite for allowing
such testimony. It is the inability of the witness to testify at trial-not the inability of the
defendant and counsel to be where the witness is--that may justify testimony from a remote
location.
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key criterion under the proposal, then, is unavailability. This is as it
should be: If testimony from a remote location is to be allowed, it
should only be when the witness is unavailable to testify in the trial
courtroom.
Defining when a witness should be deemed unavailable for pur-
pose of allowing remote testimony is not a simple matter, however.
In incorporating a portion of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) into
the proposed amendment, the Advisory Committee was presuma-
bly motivated by the thought that doing so, rather than creating a
new definition of unavailability, would be more simple and
straightforward. This approach does not work. The consequence of
a declarant being deemed unavailable under Rule 804(a) is that it
makes potentially applicable a set of hearsay exceptions, including
the one for testimony previously given, set out in Rule 804(b). That
is a considerably different matter from the question of whether
testimony from a remote location should be allowed. The incorpo-
ration of Federal Rules of Evidence 804(a) (4) and (5) would
therefore breed confusion. A rule providing for remote testimony
needs its own standard of unavailability.
To explore the inadequacy of the Advisory Committee's ap-
proach, I will consider Federal Rules of Evidence 804(a) (4) and
(5) separately. Under Rule 804(a) (4), a declarant is deemed to be
unavailable if she "is unable to be present or to testify at the hear-
ing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or
infirmity."28 Incorporating this provision into a rule for remote tes-
timony would raise three problems.
First, the reference to death does not fit. The evidence rule ad-
dresses the admissibility at trial of a statement previously made,
and if the declarant is dead at the time of trial she must plainly be
deemed unavailable then.2 9 But Rule 26, as it stands and as the Ad-
visory Committee would have amended it, is addressed to
contemporaneous testimony. Wisely, the Advisory Committee did
not suggest that corpses should be allowed to testify. If the refer-
ence to death would have any effect at all, it would only be to
generate confusion.
Second, the "or to testify" language does not fit. By hypothesis,
the witness is testifying, and so is able to testify. If she is unable "to
testify at the hearing," then in most cases it will be because she is
28. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (4).
29. There could be a question, though, of whether the proponent should be able to
take advantage of a hearsay exception based on unavailability if, before the declarant died,
the proponent had a satisfactory opportunity to take her testimony under suitable condi-
tions.
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unable to be at the hearing. But the Rule separately covers inability
"to be present ... at the hearing." What additional scope is there,
then, for the "or to testify" language? That is, when would a witness
be able to testify at the time of the trial, and be able to be in the
courtroom, but not be able to testify in the courtroom at trial? The
possibilities that are apparent suggest that the problem raised by
this language is a very substantial concern. Suppose an adult wit-
ness claimed a mental infirmity that, although not making it
impractical for her to travel to the courtroom, made it very uncom-
fortable for her to testify there and yet allowed her to testify from a
remote location. The proposed amendment seems, at least argua-
bly, to allow remote testimony in that setting. Moreover, at least
arguably it leaves room for the contention that stress from testify-
ing in the same room as the accused would constitute a sufficient
claim of infirmity for this purpose. The prosecutor could contend,
in other words, that although the witness is able to be present at
the hearing, and although she is able to testify somewhere, she is
"unable to . . testify at the hearing," and that this inability is "be-
cause of ... then existing ... mental ... infirmity. 0 0 In my view, it
would be very unfortunate if adult witnesses were able to avoid the
traditional method of giving testimony-confrontationally, face to
face, in a method intended to create some stress for a prosecution
witness-on such a basis. At least we should not adopt such a sub-
stantial alteration in our traditional method of giving testimony
without giving the matter considerable thought and study.
Third, as a corollary matter, great care must be exercised in re-
ferring to mental infirmity. Mental infirmity at the time of trial may
well effectively preclude a person from giving testimony at that
time and so weigh in favor of admitting her prior statement. But
again, by hypothesis, the witness is giving testimony as of the time
of trial, for only then does a rule allowing remote testimony come
into play. It is highly unlikely that mental infirmity will prevent a
person who is able to testify from being present at trial. Occasion-
ally, there may be some difficulty that will do this-such as an
overwhelming fear of flying, in a case in which ground transporta-
tion is not a feasible alternative-but I believe this is rare. A witness
might contend that, though she could travel to the courtroom, she
would be unable to testify there not because of fear of confronting
the defendant as such but because of a form of agoraphobia that
makes it difficult for her to be in such a formal, public place. But
this contention, it seems to me, would hardly ever be sound in fact,
30. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (4).
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and it runs too close to that of the witness who contends that she
cannot testify in front of the accused.
Now consider Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (5), which pro-
vides that a declarant is deemed unavailable if she "is absent from
the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to
procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay ex-
ception under subdivision (b) (2), (3), or (4), the declarant's
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.,1
In the context of the evidentiary rule, the parenthetical clause
means that if a proponent wants to invoke one of the enumerated
exceptions (for dying declarations, statements against interest, and
statements of personal or family history, respectively), it is not suf-
ficient for proof of unavailability that the proponent could not
secure the attendance of the declarant at trial; the proponent must
also show that he could not have deposed the declarant before
trial. In the context of a rule providing for remote testimony, this
language can have no effect, because by hypothesis the proponent
is not seeking to invoke any of the enumerated hearsay exceptions.
So again, if the language were to have any effect at all, it would be
to confuse matters, and that it would have potential to do.
In short, the judicial Conference's proposal took an unfortunate
approach by incorporating portions of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a) whole. It is perfectly appropriate to use suitable language
from Rule 804, but a rule of criminal procedure allowing remote
testimony needs its own standard of unavailability. Inability of the
prosecution to procure the witness's live testimony in court is the
key to that standard. Illness or infirmity of the witness may lead to a
conclusion that her in-court testimony cannot be procured, but
care should be taken in allowing the prosecution to present re-
mote testimony rather than in-court testimony on the basis of
mental infirmity.
31. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (5).
32. In connection with a prior draft, the Advisory Committee expressed the view that
the proposed amendment might have an impact on the operation of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 804 because the possibility of testimony by video transmission would limit the
circumstances in which a proponent could rely on Rule 804(a) (5). Advisory Committee
Note, at 189, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2001/amendments/
crb.pdf (last visited June 26, 2002). This would be true, however, only to the extent that
remote testimony under the proposal would be permissible in circumstances in which the
proponent could not take a deposition, and it is not clear to me that there would be such
circumstances or how significant they would be.
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V. Two-WAY TRANSMISSION AND OTHER QUALITY STANDARDS
Now let us assume that the witness is genuinely unavailable to
testify at trial, that the prosecution wishes to transmit her testimony
from a remote location, and that the accused and counsel have de-
clined the opportunity to transform the testimony into a
deposition by traveling to be with the witness when she testifies.
This appears to be a good case for presentation of remote testi-
mony. But the transmission must be conducted in a satisfactory
manner.
In drafting the proposed amendment, the Advisory Committee
declined, appropriately, to specify technical standards for the
transmission of testimony. But, I shall now argue, a rule governing
remote testimony should articulate quality standards of three types.
The proposed amendment articulated only one, leaving the rest to
be protected by a vague requirement that "appropriate safeguards
for the transmission [be] used."3
Two-way transmission
The one standard that the proposal did state is that transmission
must be two-way video. This is entirely appropriate: One-way
transmission, under which the witness can be seen by the others
but cannot see them, should not be deemed adequate. In Maryland
v. Craig,34 the Supreme Court did allow one-way transmission of a
child's testimony in certain instances. But for reasons I have stated
above, Craig is not a useful guide outside its limited context-not
even to what the minimum constitutional demands are and cer-
tainly not to what good policy is.
The requirement underlying the Confrontation Clause is that an
accused is entitled to have an accusing witness give testimony "face
to face." Two-way transmission arguably satisfies that concern when
actual presence in the same room is not feasible, but one-way
transmission, in which the witness is insulated from viewing the
accused, does not. Confrontation, in which the witness is made to
feel the presence of the accused, not insulated from that presence,
may inhibit some testimony, but that is precisely the point. If the
confrontation inhibits even an occasional false accusation for every
true one, the trade-off is worthwhile, given our commitment to the
33. Proposed Rule, supra note 12.
34. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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idea that convicting where the defendant is innocent is many times
worse than failure to convict when he is guilty.
5
If one-way transmission is practicable, then by hypothesis two-
way transmission almost certainly is as well, and it ought to be re-
quired3 6
Clarity of transmission and presentation
To be satisfactory, the transmission must be clear. The partici-
pants in the courtroom must be able to see and hear the witness
clearly, and the witness must be able to see and hear the judge, the
jury, counsel, and the accused clearly. The Advisory Committee
indicated some of these requirements in its Note, 7 but the text of
the amendment that it proposed did not. A newly drafted amend-
ment should articulate these requirements. This can be done by
speaking in general terms of clarity of transmission, without de-
scending to an inappropriate level of technical or technological
detail.
Coaching
Given that those in the courtroom do not have an image of the
full room in which the witness is testifying, coaching from off-
camera is a concern. In some circumstances, coaching is appropri-
ate. It is often proper, for example, if the witness is a child or a
person who needs an interpreter or has difficulties with the
35. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE
751 (1824) (endorsing 99-1 ratio)); Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of
Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1998) (discussing the trade-off of errors in
fact-finding created and avoided by the choice of evidentiary rules).
36. An argument in favor of one-way transmission might run that, if the accused
wanted the witness to see him when she testified, he could have done so (according to the
argument of this Article) by choosing to attend the giving of the testimony. Weighing against
this argument is the fact that if one-way transmission is practical then usually so too is two-
way transmission. Suppose that attending the testimony is difficult for the accused, and that
he is not concerned about the diminution of confrontation created by two-way transmission
as compared to presence in the room with the witness. Given that two-way transmission is
feasible, the accused should not be told that his choice is between attending a deposition
and having the testimony transmitted electronically from a remote location via one-way
hookup.
37. Committee Note, supra note 14, at 76:
The Committee recognized that there is a need for the trial court to impose appro-
priate safeguards and procedures to insure the accuracy and quality of the
transmission, the ability of the jurors to hear and view the testimony, and the ability
of the judge, counsel, and the witness to hear and understand each other during
questioning.
See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999).
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language. Therefore, the Rule ought to provide that any coaching
must be revealed by the transmission, so that the court can rule on
whether it is appropriate in the particular context and, if it is ap-
propriate, so that the jury will be fully aware of it. s1
VI. DEFENSE WITNESSES
My principal focus has been on the use of video transmission for
the presentation of prosecution testimony. This appears rather
clearly also to have been the principal focus of the Advisory Com-
mittee and the other bodies that have considered the proposal it
drafted, and it would presumably be the most common use of re-
mote testimony. But video transmission may also be useful for the
presentation of defense witnesses. The two situations are not sym-
metrical. Indeed, the criminal justice system is rife with
asymmetries.39 Most obviously, in this context, only the accused has
the confrontation right.40 Furthermore, unless the prosecution
proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused must be ac-
quitted. And the prosecution usually has means and resources for
producing witnesses that are superior to those of the accused. Ac-
cordingly, it is not appropriate to assume that the same standards
should apply in both settings.
38. See Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 928-29 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122
S.Ct. 1367 (2002) (while testifying from remote location, witness looked at individual off the
screen; to remedy the problem, the trial court ordered that the camera focus on both per-
sons).
39. My essay, An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories, 28 CRIM. L. BULL.
507 (1992), provides some examples, as does H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING
FIELD: IS CRIMINALJUsTICE UNFAIR? 6 (1999) (summarizing the thesis of the book that "the
whole idea that fairness in a criminal trial depends upon a literal balance of advantage is an
unfortunate metaphorical transposition"). See also id. at 18 (stating that "the fairness of the
criminal justice system [cannot] be appraised in terms of a clash of well-matched forces on a
level playing field. For one thing, we can't ignore the indisputable fact that there are one-
sided advantages-perhaps many and substantial-that are not only tolerable but valued
components of a fair system of adjudication."); id. at 306 (noting that "each challenged
item, every facet of the process in which one or the other party enjoys--or is said to enjoy-
an advantage or suffer a disadvantage, must be examined in terms of the function it serves
in the overall enterprise, and criticized according to how well or ill it serves that function").
On the general issue of asymmetry in the law, see Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for
Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments
Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REv. 979 (1995).
40. Justice Breyer emphasized this point in arguing for submission of the proposed
amendment. Statement of Breyer, J., supra note 3, at 4 (stating that "where the defendant
seeks the witness' video testimony to help secure exoneration, the Clause simply does not
apply").
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In two respects, a rule providing for remote testimony should be
more receptive to such testimony when the witness is presented by
the defense than when it is presented by the prosecution. First,
though it is still desirable for transmission to be two-way, this is not
clearly imperative.
Second, there is no need for a rigorous standard of unavailabil-
ity. If testimony of a witness for the accused in the courtroom
would be admissible, which requires that it be more probative than
prejudicial, then testimony of that witness by video transmission is
likely still to be more probative than prejudicial, but less effective
for the accused. A lenient attitude therefore appears presumptively
optimal, and no constitutional requirement makes it inappropri-
ate. Ordinarily, then, if the accused finds video transmission his
most satisfactory alternative-given the importance of the witness's
testimony and whatever costs and difficulties there may be in pre-
senting the witness in the courtroom-the court should not
second-guess thatjudgment.
CONCLUSION: A SUGGESTED REDRAFT
Perhaps presumptuously, I present here a proposal for a new
Rule 26(b). I do this very tentatively, in part, because the whole
matter requires further thought. Nevertheless, I believe this may be
useful to crystallize my comments and to show how a rule reflect-
ing them might operate. Italicized material is an addition to the
amendment proposed by the Judicial Conference, and would re-
place subdivisions (b) (2) and (b) (3) of that draft, which are
reproduced in Section II of this Article but not here; the one
clause in brackets is one that might be incorporated if otherwise
that portion of the draft seemed too rigorous:
(b) Transmitting Testimony from a Different Location.
In the interest of justice, the court may authorize
contemporaneous, two-way video presentation in
open court of testimony from a witness who is at a
different location if:
(1) the requesting party establishes exceptional
circumstances for such transmission;
(2) the transmission allows the witness, and anybody
else visible or audible to the witness, to be heard and
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seen clearly by persons participating in the trial in
the courtroom; and
(3) in the case of a witness testifying for the prosecu-
tion,
(A) the transmission allows the witness to see and
hear clearly persons participating in the trial
in the courtroom;
(B) (i) the witness is unable to be present in the
courtroom because of then-existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity, such illness or in-
firmity to be assessed without respect to the
presence of other persons in the courtroom; or
(ii) the prosecution has been unable to procure
the witness's presence in the courtroom by proc-
ess or other reasonable means; and
(C) [absent compelling circumstances making it
unfeasible to do so,] the accused and counsel
for the accused have been given an opportu-
nity to be present and to participate at the
location at which the witness testifies, and
they have not given prompt notice of intent to
exercise that opportunity; provided that, if the
accused or counsel do exercise such opportu-
nity, then the testimony shall be taken at a
time and place determined by the court in the
manner of a deposition recorded by sound-
and-visual means.4'
41. Given that subdivision (b) (3) (C) of this draft allows the accused to opt for a depo-
sition rather than electronically transmitted testimony, it might be wondered what purpose
this proposal would serve. If either the prosecutor or the accused preferred a deposition to
remote testimony, then the deposition would be held; thus testimony could be transmitted
from a remote location only if both parties agreed. What need, then, is there for a Rule?
First,Justice Breyer has raised doubts as to whether remote testimony could be allowed, even
given consent of the parties, without a change in the Rules, given the prescription in Rule 26
that unless otherwise provided by statute or Rule testimony must be taken orally in open
court. Statement of Breyer, J., supra note 3, at 6. But see Statement of Scalia, J., supra note 3,
at 3 & n (arguing that Rule 26 "does not prohibit the use of video transmission by consent").
Second, the existence of a Rule may encourage use of the practice and provide a template
for its implementation. Third, the Rule would shift a subtle burden. A prosecutor seeking to
transmit testimony from a remote location would not have to ask for a deposition and then
hope to secure the accused's agreement to the remote testimony. Instead, the prosecutor
could ask for the remote testimony, and it would be held unless the accused promptly de-
manded the deposition. Fourth, if the language in brackets is adopted (and held
constitutional), then occasionally the prosecutor could insist on transmitted testimony even
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The importance of the Supreme Court's decision not to submit
the Judicial Conference's proposal to Congress should not be un-
der-emphasized. If adopted, that proposal would work a very
significant alteration in the way that trial testimony is given and
presented. The criminal justice system should embrace the possi-
bilities of new technology. Accordingly, I believe the rulemakers
should continue to consider amending the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, perhaps along the lines I have suggested
above, to provide for remote testimony in limited circumstances.
At the same time, we should hesitate long and hard before reduc-
ing the scope of rights that have stood within our system for half a
millennium, and within other systems for much longer. The con-
frontation right reflects the deep-seated nature of human
psychology, a matter that is far more stable than technology. How
the impact of that right is affected by interposing video screens and
monitors and great distance between witness and accused is an in-
teresting issue. I do not believe we yet have a good understanding
of that issue, and so we should not cut back on the right of the ac-
cused to confront the witnesses against him "face to face."
over the objection of an accused who did not waive his right to be physically present with the
witness. Fifth, the proposal also provides for remote testimony in favor of the accused; in the
interests of clarity, it would be odd if it did not say anything about remote testimony for
prosecutors, who would most often wish to present it.
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